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Section 1044 of Dodd-Frank: When Will State Laws be
Preempted Under the OCC's Revised Regulations?
I. INTRODUCTION
As of January 31, 2012, there are 1,378 national banks regis-
tered with the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC),' each with
the ability to preempt state consumer financial laws under the National
Bank Act of 1864 (NBA). 2 The NBA gave national banks "all such in-
cidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of bank-
ing." 3 In 1996, the Supreme Court set forth the preemption standard for
national banks in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson.4
States have the power to regulate national banks to the extent state laws
do not "prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank's exer-
cise of its powers."5 In 2004, the OCC, for the first time adopted rules
setting forth a standard for preemption; state laws that "obstruct, impair
or condition" a national bank's exercise of powers under the NBA will
be preempted. 6 It has been suggested that this new standard had implic-
itly instituted field preemption of state laws that affected the operations
of national banks.7 States attempted to protect consumers with the en-
actment of anti-predatory lending laws, but the NBA preempted these
laws.8
1. National Banks Active As of 1/31/2012, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, http://www.occ.gov/topics/licensing/national-bank-lists/index-national-bank-
lists.html (last updated Jan. 31, 2012).
2. National Bank Act of 1864, Pub. L. No. 112-28, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1964) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
3. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2006).
4. 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996).
5. Id.
6. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg.
1904, 1911 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34 (2011)).
7. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency's
Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protec-
tion, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 236 (2004).
8. See, e.g., Notice, OCC Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264,
46,266 (Aug. 5, 2003); Georgia Fair Lending Act, No. 488, 2002 Ga. Laws 455 (codified as
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This broad preemption standard may have created a "race to the
bottom" between state and nationally chartered banks, which contribut-
ed to the financial crisis; and may have been lessened had Congress re-
placed the state preempted laws with federal laws that were tough on
lending practices or if federal financial regulators promulgated regula-
tions to curb abusive lending.9 Numerous individuals testified before
the Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs in 2009
about the harmful effects of preemption on consumers and the econo-
my.'0 Congress responded to the financial crisis by enacting the wide-
ranging Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank), which identified a provision affirming the standard for
preemption.
In section 1044, Dodd-Frank set forth the preemption standard
for the NBA to preempt state consumer financial laws." Pursuant to
Dodd-Frank, the OCC recently finalized the standard for preemption,
effective July 21, 2011.12 The OCC determined the preemption stand-
amended at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 to -11 (2003)).
9. See Past Problems, Future Solutions: Hearing on Consumer Protection in Fin.
Servs. Before the S. Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs Comm., 111th Cong. 3-29 (2009)
(statement of Prof. Patricia A. McCoy); John C. Dungan, Comptroller of the Currency, Of-
fice of the Comptroller of the Currency, Statement Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm'n
(Apr. 8, 2010), www.occ.gov/news-issuances/ . /201 O/pub-test-2010-39-written.pdf (stating
that although unsatisfactory consumer protection contributed to the financial crisis, there
were more fundamental issues, such as the lack of regulation for mortgage lenders and bro-
kers and underwriting practices that made it too easy for consumers to get credit); cf Letter
from Eli K. Peterson, Clearing House, to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 3 (June
27, 2011), http://www.regulations.gov (search OCC-2011-0006) [hereinafter Clearing
House Comment Letter] ("Any suggestion that Federal preemption has encouraged predato-
ry lending practices or somehow led to the subprime crisis is baseless and incorrect.").
10. Letter from Ctr. for Responsible Lending, et al., to John Walsh, Comptroller of the
Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 8 n.21 (June 27, 2010),
http://www.regulations.gov (search OCC-2011-0006) [hereinafter Ctr. for Responsible
Lending Comment Letter].
11. 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b) (Supp. IV 2010). Since Dodd-Frank only applies to state con-
sumer financial laws, the OCC did not reconsider any regulations outside of this scope in
light of the requirements set forth by Dodd-Frank. See Office of Thrift Supervision Integra-
tion; Dodd-Frank Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,557 (proposed May 26, 2011) (to be
codified in scattered parts of 12 C.F.R. pts. 4, 5, 7, 8, 28, and 34).
12. See Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76
Fed. Reg. 43,549 (July 21, 2011) (to be codified in scattered parts of 12 C.F.R. pts. 4, 5, 7,
8, 28, and 34).
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ard as "conflict preemption," in accordance with the whole analysis for
preemption set forth by the Barnett Bank Court.13
This Note examines the standard for preemption set forth in
Dodd-Frank for consumer financial laws and the amended regulations
set forth by the OCC pursuant to Dodd-Frank. This Note starts out with
an overview of preemption and an analysis of Barnett Bank, the leading
case on state law preemption.14 Part II continues with a short overview
of the 2004 regulations set forth by the OCC.'5 Part III addresses the
enactment of Dodd-Frank as it applies to consumer financial laws.16
Additionally, Part III supports the conclusion that Congress intended to
adopt the whole analysis of Barnett Bank, through a discussion of the
statutory construction of section 1044, the legislative history, textual
support in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), 17 a subsection of
1044, and case law that applied Barnett Bank to preemption determina-
tions.18 Part IV looks at the OCC's interpretation of section 1044 and
provides an overview of industry perspectives presented through com-
ment letters sent to the OCC during the notice and comment period.19
Further, Part IV discusses in detail the changes made to the 2004 regula-
tions by the OCC and how three recent court decisions have interpreted
section 1044 and the amended 2004 regulations.20 Lastly, Part IV looks
at the current status of precedent that relied on the "obstruct, impair or
condition" language.21
II. OVERVIEW OF PREEMPTION
In 1819, the Supreme Court determined that a state law, which
taxed a branch of the Second Bank of the United States, was preempted
because the state law would impede the ability of Congress to act pur-
13. Id at 43,555.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV. All comment letters are on file at http://www.regulations.gov
(search OCC-2011-0006).
20. Id.
21. Id.
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suant to the powers vested to it; this decision was the start of federal su-
premacy for national banks.22 With the passage of the NBA, Congress
gave banks "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on
the business of banking." 23 Whether the NBA preempts state law was
24extensively discussed in the Barnett Bank case.
A. Barnett Bank of Marion County, NA. v. Nelson
The issue presented in Barnett Bank was whether a federal stat-
ute that permitted national banks to sell insurance in small towns
preempted a state statute that specifically prohibited them from doing
so.25 State laws can be preempted based on three theories of preemp-
tion. 6 A state law can be explicitly preempted in the language of the
federal statute, under field preemption the court could find that a federal
statute is part of federal regulation "so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,"
or there is an "irreconcilable conflict" where, for example, both statutes
together may be a "physical impossibility."2 7 The Barnett Bank Court
analyzed the preemption issue with an inquiry into whether there was an
"'irreconcilable conflict."' 28 While the state and federal statutes are not
in direct opposition to one another, the state law prohibition was an
"'obstacle"' to one of the federal statute's purposes and was therefore
preempted by the federal statute.29 The federal statute gave broad au-
thority to national banks to engage as insurance agents. 30 The Florida
22. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 436 (1819). "The government of
the United States, then, though limited in its powers, is supreme; and its laws, when made in
pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land, 'anything in the constitu-
tion or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."' Id at 406.
23. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2006).
24. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
25. Id. at 27. "In addition to the powers now vested by law in national [banks] . . . any
such [bank] located and doing business in any place the population of which does not ex-
ceed five thousand ... may, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the
Comptroller of the Currency, act as the agent for any ... insurance company authorized by
the authorities of the State .. . to do business [there] . . . ." 12 U.S.C. § 92 (2006).
26. See Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31.
27. Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).
28. Id. (citing Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982)).
29. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
30. Id. at 32.
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statute limited insurance agent activities permissible if the insurance
agency was affiliated with a bank holding company.3' In defining the
scope of preemption, the Court stated, "normally Congress would not
want States to forbid, or to impair significantly, the exercise of a power"
granted to national banks through statutes and regulations. However,
this is not to deny states the power to regulate, if the state law "does not
prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank's exercise of its
powers."33 In reaching this conclusion, the Court referenced precedent
which determined that state laws would not be preempted if the law did
not .'unlawful[ly] encroac[h] on the rights and privileges of national
banks,' "would not 'destro[y] or hampe[r]' national banks' functions"
and "does not 'interfere with, or impair [national banks'] efficiency in
performing the functions by which they are designed to serve. "'34 Since
the Barnett Bank decision, rulemaking has expanded the scope of
preemption.
B. 2004 OCC Rulemaking
In 2004, the OCC issued regulations that contained preemption
provisions set forth in 12 C.F.R. part 34, governing real estate lending
and in three sections of part 7, governing deposit-taking activities, non-
real estate lending activities, and other authorized activities of national
banks. 35 The regulations added these provisions to clarify the applica-
tion of state law to national banks.36 Each regulation contained a provi-
sion that preempted state laws that "obstruct, impair or condition" a na-
tional bank's authority to exercise its powers.37 Sections 34.4, 7.4007
and 7.4008 included non-exclusive lists of state laws that are preempted
31. Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 29. As an "affiliated" national bank that owned a Florida
licensed insurance agency, Barnett Bank was ordered by Florida to stop selling the prohibit-
ed insurance. Id.
32. Id. at 33.
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. Id. (citing Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 247-52 (1944); McClel-
lan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 358 (1896); Nat'l Bank v. Commonwealth, 75 U.S. 353
(1870)) (alteration in original).
35. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 34.4, 7.4007, 7.4008, 7.4009 (2011).
36. See Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed.
Reg. 1904, 1905 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34 (2011)).
37. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 34.4(a), 7.4007(b), 7.4008(d), 7.4009(b)(2) (2011).
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"without regard to state law limitations concerning" the enumerated
law.38 State laws that had only an incidental effect on the national bank
were not preempted. 39 Until Dodd-Frank, no significant attempts were
40made to scale back these regulations.
III. DODD-FRANK: THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION ACT OF 2010
Dodd-Frank was enacted in the aftermath of the financial crisis
"to promote the financial stability of the United States by improving ac-
countability and transparency in the financial system, to end 'too big to
fail,' to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other pur-
poses."4' Section 1044, which is set forth in the Consumer Financial
Protection Act of Dodd-Frank, addresses state law preemption standards
for consumer financial laws.42 A state consumer financial law "directly
or indirectly discriminate[s] against national banks and [ ] directly and
specifically regulates the manner, content, or terms and conditions of
any financial transactions (as may be authorized for national banks to
engage in), or any account related thereto, with respect to a consum-
er."4 3 Under Dodd-Frank, "[s]tate consumer financial laws are to be
preempted, only if -- [ ] in accordance with the legal standard for
preemption in the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
38. See §§ 34.4(a), 7.4007(b), 7.4008(d).
39. See §§ 34.4(b)(9), 7.4007(c); 7.4008(e)(8), 7.4009(c)(2)(vii).
40. See Jared Elosta, Recent Development, Dynamic Federalism and Consumer Finan-
cial Protection: How the Dodd-Frank Act Changes the Preemption Debate, 89 N.C. L. Rev.
1273, 1275-80 (2011) (providing a history of preemption prior to Dodd-Frank).
41. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
42. See 12 U.S.C. § 25b (Supp. IV 2010). Dodd-Frank eliminated preemption of state
law by national bank subsidiaries, agents and affiliates. See id Dodd-Frank changed the
preemption standards applicable to federal savings associations to conform to those laws
applicable to national banks. See § 1465. Dodd-Frank transferred to the OCC from the Of-
fice of Thrift Supervision all functions relating to federal savings associations. See § 5411-
12.
43. 12 U.S.C. § 25b(a)(2). The Consumer Mortgage Coalition has suggested the OCC
clarify what the terms "directly" or "specifically" include. Letter from Anne C. Canfield,
Exec. Dir. Consumer Mortgage Coal. to John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 4 (June 27, 2011) [hereinafter Consumer Mort-
gage Coal. Comment Letter].
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Barnett Bank ... the State consumer financial law prevents or signifi-
cantly interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its pow-
ers. .. .'44 A preemption determination is to be made by a court, or by
the OCC through an order or regulation, based on a case-by-case deter-
mination.4 5 Dodd-Frank defined case-by-case as a determination by the
OCC "concerning the impact of a particular state law."
A. Statutory Construction
"[T]he normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress
intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created
concept, it makes that intent specific.'A7 If the Barnett Bank standard
were determined to be a stand-alone standard of "prevent or significant-
ly interfere," long standing precedent consistent with the principles of
Barnett Bank would be reversed. 8 Section 1044 does not explicitly
state that Congress intended to reverse these decisions; a limitation read
into the Barnett Bank preemption standard would be in opposition to
statutory construction principles. The courts will also pay close atten-
tion to the legislative history. 4 9 As illustrated in Part II.B., Congress did
not intend to limit Barnett Bank to "prevent or significantly interfere."5 o
The use of "prevent or significantly interfere" is a tool of statutory con-
struction to incorporate the case law related to state law preemption; the
phrase was used as shorthand. Congress also required a preemption
44. 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B).
45. § 25b.
46. § 25b(b)(3)(A). The OCC is required to consult with the Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau in making preemption determinations. § 25b(b)(3)(B).
47. Letter from Senator Carper and Senator Warner, U.S. Senate, to Timothy Geithner,
Dep't of Treasury 3 (July 8, 2011) [hereinafter Senators Carper and Warner Comment Let-
ter] (citing Noland v. United States, 517 U.S. 535, 541 (1996)).
48. See OCC Interpretative Letter, No. 1132 (May 12, 2011),
http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents/mayll/intmay11.html (follow
"1132 " PDF) [hereinafter Interpretative Letter].
49. Senators Carper and Warner Comment Letter, supra note 47, at 3 (citing Henning
v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 530 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2008)).
50. See discussion infra Part III.B.
51. Clearing House Comment Letter, supra note 9, at 5-6; see also Letter from Minh-
Duc T. Le., Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Capital One Fin. Corp., to Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency 2 (June 30, 2011) [hereinafter Capital One Comment Letter] (stating "[t]he
Barnett 'standard' . . . is broader and more complex than the 'significantly interferes' short-
hand used in section 1044.").
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determination to be made "'in accordance with' . . . Barnett Bank," if
Congress did not want the OCC to consider the analysis of Barnett Bank
as a whole, the statute would have simply "direct[ed] the OCC to 'apply
the legal standard for preemption."' 52
While one critic has argued that the reference to Barnett Bank
was simply to clarify that Barnett Bank is the source of law for the
"prevent of significantly interfere" language, this interpretation does not
withstand a statutory construction analysis. 53 "It is the duty of the court
to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, avoid-
ing, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was
ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed." 54 It would not
have been necessary for Congress to include the reference to Barnett
Bank if it was solely to provide the source of law. "Prevent or signifi-
cantly interfere" as a stand-alone provision would be interpreted as a
two-prong analysis inquiring whether the state law would either (1) pre-
vent and/or (2) significantly interfere with a national bank, regardless if
Barnett Bank was referenced; therefore, "in accordance with Barnett
Bank" would be superfluous. This argument has been made about the
OCC's treatment of "prevent or significantly interfere" as a touch-
stone.55 However, the reference to "prevent or significantly interfere"
read in conjunction with "in accordance with Barnett Bank" was intend-
ed to include the other formulations of conflict preemption used in Bar-
nett Bank in order to provide an illustrative and explanatory reference of
the degree to which interference with national bank powers would give
rise to preemption.5 6 Neither Barnett Bank nor "prevent or significantly
52. Letter from Carl Levin, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov't Affairs, to Timo-
thy Geithner, Sec'y of the Treasury and John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 7 (July 13, 2011) [hereinafter Comm. on Home-
land Sec. and Gov't Affairs Comment Letter].
53. See Letter from Suzanne Martindale, Staff Attorney, Consumers Union, to John
Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 3
[hereinafter Consumers Union Comment Letter]; Letter from Benjamin M. Lawsky, Super-
intendent of Fin. Servs. and Acting Superintendent of Banks, State of N.Y. Banking Dep't,
to John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
3 (June 27, 2011) [hereinafter N.Y. Banking Dep't Comment Letter] (arguing that the refer-
ence to Barnett Bank is irrelevant to interpret the preemption standard).
54. Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883).
55. See Consumers Union Comment Letter, supra note 53, at 3.
56. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg.
30,557, 30,563 (proposed May 26, 2011) (to be codified in scattered parts of 12 C.F.R. pts.
168 [Vol. 16
DF SECTION 1044: OCC AND PREEMPTION
interfere" is superfluous. Congress did not state the preemption stand-
ard to be Barnett Bank in and of itself because Congress intended to
scale back the OCC's interpretation, which broadened the scope of
"prevent or significantly interfere" in the 2004 regulations. 7 The ex-
emplary language was necessary to ensure the OCC understood it had
gone too far in the 2004 regulations. As noted in its final rule, the OCC
perceived this language as a message that Congress rejected the "ob-
* 58
struct, impair or condition" language.
B. Legislative History Section 1044
On December 2, 2009, Representative Frank introduced a House
bill to provide regulatory reform, which included reformation of the
preemption standard for state consumer financial laws.5 9 While the bill
proposed a preemption standard that called upon the Comptroller of the
Currency to determine whether a state law would "prevent or signifi-
cantly interfere" with a national bank's ability to engage in the "busi-
ness of banking," the bill did not refer to the Barnett Bank decision.60
The bill did not pass in the House. The standard was amended to: "pre-
vents, significantly interferes with, or materially impairs"6' and passed
the House on December 11, 2009.6
After the Act was referred to the Senate,63 the Senate consented
to strike the entirety of the Act following the enactment clause and sub-
4, 5, 7, 8, 28, and 34). The reference to Barnett Bank was intended to address a problem
Senator Carper saw in the version of Dodd-Frank that passed the House without Barnett
Bank incorporated into the standard. A reference was necessary to "ensure the preemption
principles in the Barnett case were preserved." Interpretative Letter, supra note 48, at 2.
57. See Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov't Affairs Comment Letter, supra note 52,
at 7.
58. See Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. 43,549, 43,556 & n.41 (July 21, 2011) (to be codified in scattered parts of 12 C.F.R.
pts. 4, 5, 7, 8, 28, and 34).
59. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2009) (proposed Dec. 2, 2009).
60. Id. at 832.
61. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, at 1002,
111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
62. 156 CONG. REc. H14,804 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2009) (passing as amended, by 223
yeas to 202 nays).
63. 156 CONG. REc. S49 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 2010) (referred to the Sen. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs).
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stituted a new bill.64 The amended bill changed the preemption standard
to include the Barnett Bank standard without reference to "prevent or
significantly interfere."6 s In spite of additional amendments made to the
bill, the preemption standard was not changed significantly.66 The Sen-
ate agreed to the language of the amendment and agreed to insert the
amendment in lieu of the preemption standard that had previously
passed in the House.67
At the House-Senate Conference, both the House and Senate
adopted the preemption standard that was ultimately set forth-in section
1044 of Dodd-Frank.68 During the congressional proceedings and de-
bates, Senator Dodd was questioned by Senator Carper whether the
Conference Committee, which restated the preemption standard in a
slightly different version than the Senate proposed amendment, main-
tained the standard for preemption in Barnett Bank; Senator Dodd an-
swered in the affirmative. 69 Senator Carper responded and stated that he
believed this change would provide certainty to consumers and national
banks.70 In the accompanying House Report submitted by Senator
Dodd, he stated: "[t]he standard for preempting State consumer finan-
cial law would return to what it had been for decades, those recognized
by the Supreme Court in Barnett Bank ... undoing broader standards
adopted by rules, orders, and interpretations issued by the OCC in
64. See 156 CONG. REc. S4077 (daily ed. May 20, 2010) (agreeing to strike the text
after the enacting clause and substitute the language of S. 3217, as amended (by unanimous
consent)).
65. See Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong.
(2010).
66. See 156 CONG. REc. S3873 (daily ed. May 18, 2010) (agreeing to Amdt. 4071 to S.
3217 ("Carper Amendment")) ("[T]he State consumer financial law is preempted in accord-
ance with the legal standard of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, Florida Insurance Commissioner, et al.,
517 U.S. 25 (1996), and any preemption determination under this subparagraph may be
made by a court, or by regulation or order of the Comptroller of the Currency on a case-by-
case basis, in accordance with applicable law.").
67. 156 CONG. REc. S4043 (daily ed. May 20, 2010) (agreeing to cloture motion on
Admt. 3739 to S 3217 ("Dodd/Lincoln Amendment")).
68. See H. REP. No. 111-517, at 875 (2010) (Conf. Rep.).
69. 156 CONG. REc. S5902 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (colloquy between Senator Carper
and Senator Dodd) ("There should be no doubt that the legislation codified the preemption
standard by the U.S. Supreme Court in that case.").
70. Id. (statement of Senator Carper).
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2004."71 Senator Johnson also commented that the legislation clearly
codified Barnett Bank into Dodd-Frank.72
During the comment process on the proposed rule, Senator
Carper and Senator Warner submitted a comment letter to the OCC on
behalf of the United States Senate. Both Senators were involved in
the negotiations of the preemption standard during the Conference
Committee.74 The Senators maintained that the standard for preemption
requires the OCC to adopt a standard "in accordance with Barnett
Bank," and not "in accordance with 'part of the legal standard."7  The
letter rejected the supposition that Dodd-Frank chose to single out "pre-
vent or significantly interfere" as a stand-alone standard; the reference
to "prevent or significantly interfere" was just "a touchstone of the Bar-
nett Bank Case [and] [i]t is not a limiting phrase and cannot reasonably
be read to be one."76
While the legislative history clearly demonstrates Congress in-
tended the preemption standard to be in accordance with the Barnett
Bank decision, nothing more and nothing less; critics still claim to find
support in the legislative history that Dodd-Frank created a new stand-
alone standard.77 The Department of the Treasury, the Department that
houses the OCC, wrote a comment letter that opposed the proposed
rule.78 Treasury argued in its letter that the OCC broadened the stand-
ard beyond Dodd-Frank.79 In support, Treasury pointed to a statement
in the Conference Committee Report that referred to the language of the
71. S. REP. No. 111-176, at 175-76 (2010) (Conf. Rep.).
72. 156 CONG. REc. S5888-89 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Senator John-
son); see also H. REP. No. 111-517, at 744 (2010) (Conf. Rep.).
73. See Senators Carper and Warner Comment Letter, supra note 47.
74. Id. at 1-2.
75. Id.
76. Id. (rejecting the premise of the comment letter written by George W. Madison on
behalf of Treasury, which suggested that "prevent or significantly interfere" is a new stand-
ard taken from the Barnett Bank case).
77. See, e.g., N.Y. Banking Dep't Comment Letter, supra note 53, at 4-5 (arguing that
the colloquies between Senator Carper and Johnson support the conclusion that "prevent or
significantly interfere" is the standard Congress intended to adopt).
78. Letter from George W. Madison, Dep't of the Treasury, to John Walsh, Acting
Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 3 (June 27, 2011)
[hereinafter Treasury Comment Letter].
79. Id. at 1.
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statute as a revision.80  However, Senator Carper and Senator Warner
refuted this statement as support for a new standard; they argued Treas-
ury took the statement out of context.8 ' The Senators criticized Treas-
ury for ignoring the very next sentence of the Conference Committee
Report, which stated that the Barnett Bank decision is codified as the
standard.82 The senators further explained that the committee believed
the OCC had taken preemption too far beyond Barnett Bank in their
2004 regulation, and in order to return to the Barnett Bank standard, a
revision was required.
The preemption standard is conflict preemption, in accordance
with the Barnett Bank analysis as a whole. This is the standard Con-
gress intended when it adopted section 1044 of Dodd-Frank. While
Treasury attempted to interpret Congressional intent for a stand-alone
standard of "prevent or significantly interfere," a thorough reading of
the legislative history and a comment letter from two senators who ne-
gotiated the standard, demonstrate otherwise. Support can also be
found in a subsection of section 1044 and the GLBA.84
C. Further Textual Support in Section 1044 and the GLBA
The OCC found support in the text of section 1044(c) of Dodd-
Frank, which requires a regulation or order by the OCC to be supported
by "substantial evidence" that a preemption decision was made "in ac-
cordance with the legal standard of the decision of Barnett Bank."85
This provision does not reference the "prevent or substantially interfere"
80. Id. at 3 (referencing H. REP. No. 111-517, at 744 (July 29, 2010) (Conf. Rep.)).
81. Senators Carper and Warner Comment Letter, supra note 47, at 1 & n. 1.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See discussion infra Part III.C.
85. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration, Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. 43,549, 43,555 (July 21, 2011) (to be codified in scattered parts of 12 C.F.R. pts. 4, 5,
7, 8, 28, and 34) (referencing 12 U.S.C. § 25b(c) (Supp. IV 2010)); see also Letter from
Wayne Abernathy, Exec. Vice President, Am. Bankers Ass'n to John G. Walsh, Acting
Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 3 (June 27, 2011)
[hereinafter ABA Comment Letter]. The OCC also contends that there is textual support in
Dodd-Frank §1046. Section 1046 requires any determination that preempts state laws re-
garding federal savings associations to be in accordance with the legal standard for national
banks. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration, Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 43,555.
172 [Vol. 16
2012] DF SECTION 1044: OCC AND PREEMPTION 173
language. The OCC and Senators Carper and Warner took the position
that if the Barnett Bank analysis were reduced to a stand-alone test of
"prevent or significantly interfere," as opposed to the whole of the deci-
sion, the courts and the OCC would be applying different preemption
standards. 86 The courts would be required to comply with the Barnett
Bank standard as a whole, while the OCC would be subjected to a more
restricted standard.87  This would be an inconsistent application of the
preemption standard.88 Senator Carper and Senator Warner found any
interpretation of the statute that could come to this conclusion to be ab-
surd.89
Congress passed the GLBA in 1999, which stated a similar
preemption standard for state laws regulating insurance sales by deposi-
tory institutions or their affiliates. 90 The GLBA adopted the "legal
standards" set forth in Barnett Bank for preemption, under which no
state through its laws may "prevent or significantly interfere" with a de-
posit institution's ability to perform insurance activities.91 The language
relied upon in the GLBA is almost indistinguishable from the language
of section 1044.92 Case law interpreting this provision confirms that
86. See Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76
Fed. Reg. at 43,555-56; Senators Carper and Warner Comment Letter, supra note 47, at 2.
87. See Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76
Fed. Reg. at 43,555-56 (referencing 12 U.S.C. § 1465 (Supp. IV 2010)); Senators Carper
and Warner Comment Letter, supra note 47, at 2 ("Thus courts are explicitly ordered to
judge the OCC's determination based on the legal standard of Barnett, not some part of it.").
88. See Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76
Fed. Reg. at 43,555.
89. Senators Carper and Warner Comment Letter, supra note 47, at 2; see also Office
of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,555
("It would not make sense for this 'substantial evidence' requirement to require compliance
with a different preemption standard than the standard intended by the Barnett standard
preemption provision.").
90. See 15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(a) (2006)).
91. Id.
92. ABA Comment Letter, supra note 85, at 3. Dodd-Frank used the singular of stand-
ard, in contrast to the GLBA, which used standards; this difference could be interpreted as a
limitation, however, it does not appear that this was Congress' intent. When Congress con-
sidered the GLBA, Senator Bryan, the sponsor of the amendment setting forth the preemp-
tion standard, stated that the 'prevent or significantly interfere' language was taken directly
from the Supreme Court's Barnett decision and is intended to codify that decision." 145
CONG. REc. 6046 (daily ed. May 24, 1999) (statement of Senator Bryan); see also H. REP.
No. 106-434, at 156-57, 106th Cong. (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1999) (Conf. Rpt.) ("States may not
prevent or significantly interfere with the activities of depository institutions or their affili-
ates, as set forth in Barnett Bank."). Senator Dodd similarly stated that "there should be no
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"prevent or significantly interfere" codified the Barnett Bank standard
as a whole. 93 For example, in Massachusetts Bankers Association v.
Bowler,94 the court determined if it were required to find a state law
prohibited an activity of a national bank before it could be preempted,
as the defendant contended, the court would be required to ignore the
plain language of the GLBA and the decision of Barnett Bank.95 The
court did not limit its interpretation of Barnett Bank to the "prevent or
significantly interfere" language.96 Based on the similarity in the lan-
guage, it is reasonable that Congress intended the standard to achieve
the same result.97
D. Precedent Supports Barnett Bank as Applied Beyond "Prevent
or Significantly Interfere"
The standard in Barnett Bank has been applied with reference to
not only the "prevent or significantly interfere" language of the opinion,
but also to the other amalgamations of language from precedent cited by
the Barnett Bank Court. In 2001, the Sixth Circuit decided Association
of Banks in Insurance Inc. v. Duryee,98 dealing with the right of a na-
tional bank to act as an insurance agent under the GLBA. 99 The defend-
ant contended that under Barnett Bank the state law at issue should not
be considered to "prevent or significantly interfere" unless it "essential-
ly thwarted" the national bank's ability to exercise its powers and be-
cause the state law here did not "totally prohibit" the powers of the na-
doubt that the legislation codified the preemption standard stated" in Barnett Bank. 156
CONG. REc. S5,902 (daily ed. July 15, 2010). Furthermore, section 1046 of Dodd-Frank
addresses the preemption standard for federal savings associations. As amended by Dodd-
Frank, determinations regarding federal savings associations "shall be made in accordance
with the laws and legal standards applicable to national banks regarding the preemption of
State law." 12 U.S.C. § 1465 (Supp. IV 2010) (emphasis added).
93. Senators Carper and Warner Comment Letter, supra note 47, at 2 & n.5 (citing
Ass'n of Banks in Ins. v. Duryee, 270 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2001); Bowler v. Hawke, 320 F.3d
59, 64 (1st Cir. 2003); Mass. Bankers Ass'n v. Bowler, 392 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D. Ma. 2005)).
94, 392 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D. Ma. 2005).
95. Id. at 27 n.2.
96. Id.
97. Senators Carper and Warner Comment Letter, supra note 47, at 3.
98. Ass'n of Banks in Ins. v. Duryee, 270 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2001).
99. Id. at 400.
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tional bank, the state law cannot be preempted. 00 The court refused to
equate "prevent or significantly interfere" with "effectively thwart."' 0'
The court referenced two cases cited by the Barnett Bank Court to de-
termine the scope of "prevent or significantly interfere;" specifically,
the court relied on the following language: "'impair the efficiency of na-
tional banks' or would 'destroy' or 'hamper national bank's functions'
and "interfere with or impair efficiency."' 02 In 2003, the Fifth Circuit,
in Wells Fargo Bank of Texas, N.A. v. James0 3 determined the state law
was preempted because the state statute "interfere[d] with a power
which national banks are authorized to exercise, the state statute irrec-
oncilably conflict[ed] with the Federal statute and is preempted by op-
eration of the Supremacy Clause ... [and] Barnett Bank." 04 In Wa-
chovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 05 the Second Circuit stated that "'conflict
preemption'[ ] can arise where 'state law stands as an obstacle to the ac-
complishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress.""106 In 2008, a district court concluded that the NBA preempted a
state law because it would "frustrate[ ] or limit[ ] the ability of a nation-
al bank."'o In 2009, the Third Circuit denied the national bank's mo-
tion to dismiss since the state law did not "interfere with the purposes of
national banks. . . tend to impair or destroy the efficiency of national
banks as federal agencies, or . .. conflict with any other provision of
federal law." 08 These cases applied the foundational principles of Bar-
nett Bank and demonstrate that the decision is not limited to "prevent or
significantly interfere" as the standard for preemption.
Preemption analysis, as correctly adopted, is a conflict preemp-
tion legal standard in accordance with the full analysis of preemption set
100. Id. at 409 (citing Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 28-
29 (1996)).
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting McCellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 358 (1896); First Nat'1 Bank v.
Ky., 76 U.S. 353, 362 (1969)).
103. 321 F. 3d 488 (5th Cir. 2003).
104. Id. at 492 (quoting U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31).
105. 414 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2005).
106. Id. at 313-14 (quoting Fid. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
153 (1982)).
107. Pac. Capital Bank, N.A., v. Milgram, No. 08-0223, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19639,
at *12 (D. N.J. Mar. 13, 2008).
108. Young v. Wells Fargo & Co., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1021 (3d Cir. 2009).
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out in Barnett Bank. "Prevent or significantly interfere" is only one
hallmark of the conflict preemption standard and analysis.' 09 The Bar-
nett Bank Court in its analysis did not limit itself to the "prevent or sig-
nificantly interfere" language; courts post-Barnett Bank have logically
inferred that their analysis of state law preemption is not to be based
solely on "prevent or significantly interfere." If Dodd-Frank were in-
tended to create a new standard of preemption, precedent making up an
extensive body of national bank law would be questioned or rejected."o
Congress would have discussed the challenges national banks and gov-
ernment agencies would encounter. Moreover, Congress would have
adopted the original bill of Dodd-Frank, which did not make any refer-
ence to Barnett Bank, but simply stated "prevent or significantly inter-
fere" as the preemption standard."' It is simply a matter of practicality;
to include all the analysis the court considered in the Barnett Bank case
would have been unreasonable.1 12
IV. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN GOING FORWARD?
A. OCC Rulemaking after Dodd-Frank
On May 26, 2011, the OCC published in the Federal Register a
notice of proposed rulemaking to implement, among other provisions of
Dodd-Frank, section 1044.113 On July 21, 2011, the OCC released its
final rule, in the interim the OCC received over forty comment letters,
109. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. 43,549, 43,555 (July 21, 2011) (to be codified in scattered parts of 12 C.F.R. pts. 4, 5,
7, 8, 28, and 34); see also Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Ap-
praisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1909 (Jan. 13 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34 (2011))
(stating there cannot be one "infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yard-
stick") (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
110. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 43,555. See generally Letter from Richard M. Whiting, Exec. Dir. & Gen. Counsel,
Fin. Servs. Roundtable, to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 1 [hereinafter Fin.
Servs. Roundtable Comment Letter] (stating that the notice of proposed rulemaking pre-
serves over 150 years of Supreme Court decisions that determined a state law was preempt-
ed by federal law under the NBA).
Ill. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
112. Senators Carper and Warner Comment Letter, supra note 47, at 1.
113. See Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. 30,557 (proposed May 26, 2011) (to be codified in scattered parts of 12 C.F.R. pts. 4,
5, 7, 8, 28, and 34).
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the majority of which were from banking and financial institutions,
trade associations, and advocacy groups."14 The OCC concluded that
Dodd-Frank incorporated the conflict preemption standard and reason-
ing set forth in Barnett Bank, rejecting a stand-alone "prevent or signifi-
cantly interfere" standard as proposed in some comment letters." 5 The
OCC explained that their determination was based on the language of
the statute, the language of other related provisions in Dodd-Frank that
addressed preemption, the interpretation of "virtually identical preemp-
tion language" in the GLBA and subsequent explanation of the intent of
the GLBA sponsors, and explanation of the standard provided by the
sponsors at the time Dodd-Frank was enacted.' 16 The OCC determined
the use of "prevent or significantly interfere" in the statute was only a
"touchstone" and the language in the statute preceding the phrase,
which requires the standard be in accordance with Barnett Bank cannot
be separated from the interpretation.117
The OCC eliminated the "obstruct, impair or condition" lan-
guage from 12 C.F.R. sections 7.4007(b), 7.4008(d), and 34.4(a), and
deleted section 7.4009 in its entirety.11 8 Although the OCC proposed to
delete this language in the proposed rule, it stated a caveat that defined
its intention and effect of the deletion; the language was deleted solely
to remove any ambiguity placed on the principles of Barnett Bank." 9
The OCC cautioned that "obstructs, impairs or conditions" was lan-
guage construed from precedent relied upon by the Supreme Court in
Barnett Bank, and as a result, any existing precedent that relied upon
this language remains valid.120 In the final rule, the OCC reversed its
position. "[I]nclusion of the 'prevent or significantly interferes' conflict
preemption formulation in the Barnett Bank standard preemption provi-
114. See Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76
Fed. Reg. 43,549 (July 21, 2011) (to be codified in scattered parts of 12 C.F.R. pts. 4, 5, 7,
8, 28, and 34).
115. See id at 43,554.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 43,555.
118. Id. at 43,555-56.
119. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg.
30,557, 30,563 (proposed May 26, 2011) (to be codified in scattered parts of 12 C.F.R. pts.
4, 5, 7, 8, 28, and 34).
120. Id.
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sion may have been intended to change the OCC's approach by shifting
the basis of preemption back to the decision itself, rather than placing
reliance on the OCC's effort to distill the Barnett Bank principles in this
matter."' 2' Deletion of the language was also intended to clear up any
ambiguities regarding whether Barnett Bank is the governing standard
for preemption determinations.122 Case law that relied exclusively on
the "obstruct, impair or condition" standard, if any, will have to be test-
ed against the Barnett Bank conflict preemption standard.123 The OCC
stated that it has not identified any precedent that relied solely on the
"obstruct, impair or condition" standard.124 The OCC also determined
that the case-by-case procedural requirements only apply to determina-
tions made after July 21, 2011, the effective date of Dodd-Frank. 25
Regulations effective on this date are valid subject to the Barnett Bank
standard.126 In addition, the OCC stated that it would determine wheth-
er state laws of general applicability apply to national banks under the
Barnett Bank preemption standard.127
The comment letters primarily addressed whether the OCC's
proposed rule for the preemption standard is in accordance with Dodd-
Frank, whether the 2004 regulations that contain "obstruct, impair or
condition" are still valid post-Dodd-Frank, and whether case-by-case
determination requires the OCC to revisit the 2004 rules. The American
Bankers Association (ABA), a trade association representing both na-
tionally and state chartered banks, submitted a comment letter to the
121. See Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76
Fed. Reg. 43,549, 43,556 (July 21, 2011) (to be codified in scattered parts of 12 C.F.R. pts.
4, 5, 7, 8, 28, and 34).
122. Id.
123. Id. Under § 1043 of Dodd-Frank, it may be possible for a case that relied exclu-
sively on the "obstructs, impairs or conditions" language to still be considered good law un-
der Dodd-Frank. Id. at 43,556 n.43 (referencing 12 U.S.C. § 5553 (Supp. IV 2010)).
124. Id. at 43,556 n.43.
125. Id at 43,557.
126. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. 43,549, 43,557 (July 21, 2011) (to be codified in scattered parts of 12 C.F.R. pts. 4, 5,
7, 8, 28, and 34).
127. Id at 43,557-58 & n.50. For example, the governance of contracts and the acquisi-
tion and transfer of property are considered laws of general applicability. See Watters v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 11 (2007) (citing Nat'l Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S.
353 (1870)).
178 [Vol. 16
2012] DF SECTION 1044: OCC AND PREEMPTION 179
OCC. 128 The ABA comment letter is representative of the position tak-
en by nationally chartered banks,129 federal savings banks,130 payment
service providers,131 a bank holding corporation, a law firm that submit-
ted comments on behalf of a state chartered bank,132 the Consumer
Bankers Association,133 and Financial Services Roundtable.134 For this
reason, the Note will focus on the ABA's position taken on the issues
discussed in the comment process.
The ABA's position is that Dodd-Frank codified the Barnett
Bank analysis.' 35 The ABA relied on the statutory language, the legisla-
tive history of section 1044, other provisions of Dodd-Frank, principles
of statutory construction, and judicial interpretations of Dodd-Frank.13 6
The ABA noted the practical consequences banks would face if the fed-
eral preemption standard changed,' 37 suggesting that banks would need
128. ABA Comment Letter, supra note 85.
129. See Letter from Stephen M. Cutler, Exec. Vice President and Gen. Counsel, JP
Morgan Chase & Co, to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (June 27, 2011); Letter
from Kenneth L. Miller, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Bank of Am., to Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (June 27, 2011); Capital One Comment Letter, supra note 51; Letter from
Joseph T. Green, TCF Fin. Corp., to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (June 27,
2011); Letter from R. Glenn Taylor, Senior Vice President and Counsel, First Tenn., to Of-
fice of the Comptroller of the Currency (June 27, 2011); Letter from Patricia Grace, Assoc.
Gen. Counsel, HSBC Bank USA, et al., to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (June
27, 2011).
130. See Letter from Mindy Harris, Senior Vice President, Gen. Counsel, Nordstrom
fsb, to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (June 27, 2011); Letter from Mark R.
Thresher, Exec. Vice President and Chief Fin. Officer, Nationwide, to John Walsh, Acting
Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (June 23, 2011).
131. See Letter from Alex E. Miller, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, VISA Inc., to Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (June 27, 2011); Clearing House Comment Letter, supra note
9.
132. Letter from Steven L. Philpott, Exec. Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Umpqua
Holdings Corporation, to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (June 27, 2011); Letter
from Cary Plotkin Kavy, Cox Smith, to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (June 27,
2011).
133. See Letter from Steven I. Zeisel, Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Consumer
Bankers Ass'n, to John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency (June 27, 2011) [hereinafter Consumer Bankers Ass'n Comment Letter].
134. Fin. Servs. Roundtable Comment Letter, supra note 110, at 1.
135. ABA Comment Letter, supra note 85, at 1. But see Consumer Mortgage Coal.
Comment Letter, supra note 43, at 3 (arguing that Congress intended "prevent or signifi-
cantly interfere" to be an alternative, thereby permitting a national bank to preempt a state
law if it only partially interferes with the national bank).
136. ABA Comment Letter, supra note 85, at 2.
137. Id. at 4.
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to determine whether state laws are applicable to them, which would en-
tail substantial costs, revisions to processes, changes to long-standing
business models, customer inconvenience, and changes to customer re-
lationships. 138 For example, the ABA stated that customer relationships
would need to be changed to comply with requirements relating to ac-
count disclosures, non-interest fee restrictions, and use of third-party
agents and customer agreements.139  Conversely, regulators of state
chartered banks140 and advocacy groups opposed the proposed rule and
argued that the preemption standard is limited by Dodd-Frank to "pre-
vent or significantly impair."'l41 The position taken by the State of New
York Banking Department (NY Banking Department) is representative:
the plain meaning of the statutory language is limited to "prevent or
significantly interfere," and the fact that the section calls for the stand-
ard to be "in accordance with the legal standard for preemption" in Bar-
nett Bank is not relevant.142 The NY Banking Department further main-
tained if Congress wanted to take the standard and use it only as a
starting point, it would have said this; the NY Banking Department as-
serts support in the legislative history. 143
The ABA argued that the 2004 regulations were a codification
of the Barnett Bank analysis and are therefore still valid under Dodd-
Frank.144  Specifically, the ABA supported its position by suggesting
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. N.Y. Banking Dep't Comment Letter, supra note 53, at 3-4; see also Letter from
Joseph A. Smith Jr., Comm'r of Banks, State of North Carolina, Office of the Comm'r of
Banks, to John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency 2 (June 27, 2011) [hereinafter N.C. Office of Comm'r of Banks Comment Letter]
("The standard for preemption is not conflict preemption as the OCC has continuously in-
terpreted and applied and construed it and as the proposed rulemaking again proposes.").
141. See, e.g., Letter from Neil Milner, President and CEO, Conference of State Bank
Supervisors, to John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of Currency, Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency 2 (June 27, 2011) ("The plain language and legislative intent of the law clearly
establish that the OCC may preempt a State consumer protection law only where the State
law 'prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise by [a] national bank of its pow-
ers."') (alteration in the original); Consumers Union Comment Letter, supra note 53, at 2
(finding "[s]ubparagraph (B) does more than simply make reference to the Barnett Bank
decision as a whole; rather, it states in plain language that a State law is preempted if it
prevents or significantly interferes with' a national bank's exercise of its powers.").
142. N.Y. Banking Dep't Comment Letter, supra note 53, at 3.
143. Id. at 4-5.
144. ABA Comment Letter, supra note 85, at 4.
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that the preamble for the 2004 regulations set forth the "obstruct, impair
or condition" standard as a codification of applicable case law and was
not a new standard. 145 The ABA also maintained there is support in the
Comptroller's 2004 testimony before the Senate Banking Committee
stating the regulations "did nothing more than 'distill the various
phrases"' used by the Supreme Court to make preemption determina-
tions.14 6 Also, the ABA urged the OCC not to delete section 7.4009, ra-
ther the ABA recommended substituting a reference to the Barnett Bank
standard to replace "obstruct, impair or condition."l 4 7  The Clearing
House argued that many aspects of bank operations that are incidental to
the "business of banking" are not addressed by other rules or precedent,
thus it is necessary to maintain section 7.4009 for clarity and consisten-
cy purposes.14 8 Consumer Bank Association is concerned that leaving
in sections 7.4007 and 7.4008, but removing section 7.4009 will be used
to argue that laws effecting national bank operations should be treated
differently than laws on lending or deposit taking powers. 149 Presuma-
bly, Consumer Bank Association is concerned that laws regulating bank
operations will be more difficult for national banks to preempt.
Commentators who are opposed to the OCC's interpretation of
"obstruct, impair or condition" have suggested the OCC either revise
the rules or repeal the regulations in their entirety. The North Carolina
Commissioner of Banks argued that "prevent or significantly interfere"
is not the same standard as "obstruct, impair or condition," therefore the
OCC must review and revise the standard and review all decisions that
rest on this standard.150 The NY Banking Department suggested section
145. Id. (citing Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69
Fed. Reg. 1904, 1904 (Jan. 13 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34 (2011)).
146. Id. at 5 (citing Review of the Nat '1 Bank Preemption Rules: Hearing Before the S.
Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs Comm., 108th Cong. 5, 47 (2004) (statement of John D.
Hawke).
147. Id. at 6.
148. Clearing House Comment Letter, supra note 9, at 8-9.
149. Consumer Bankers Ass'n Comment Letter, supra note 133, at 5.
150. See N.C. Office of Comm'r of Banks Comment Letter, supra note 140, at 3; Letter
from Lisa Madigan et al, state attorney generals, Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys Gen., to John
Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 3-4
(June 27, 2011) [hereinafter Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys Gen. Comment Letter] ("[T]he OCC
must review its existing preemption precedents . . . [bly stating that precedents based on the
"obstruct, interfere or condition" language remain valid, the OCC is subverting the intention
of Congress by essentially continuing to use the standard that was rejected by Dodd-Frank
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1043 of Dodd-Frank supports the conclusion that the codification of
"prevent or significantly interfere" rejected "obstruct, impair or condi-
tion" by implication.'5 ' Under section 1043, a contract entered into be-
fore Dodd-Frank is not affected by any changes in the preemption
standard. 15 2 The NY Banking Department reasoned; if prior precedent
remained valid after the new standard, it would not have been necessary
to include this section.' 53 Consumers Union suggested the OCC's anal-
ysis ignored the fact that Dodd-Frank limited Barnett Bank to "prevent
or significantly interfere" and because the OCC's proposed change to
the 2004 regulations requires state laws be in accordance with Barnett
Bank as a whole, the proposed rules cannot be valid under Dodd-
Frank.154  This argument is dependent upon the determination that a
Barnett Bank analysis is limited to "prevent or significantly interfere."
Advocacy groups, including the National Association of Consumer Ad-
vocates, suggested that Congress intended to undo the broader standards
for preemption adopted by the OCC in 2004, and therefore, the OCC is
required to repeal the 2004 regulations and issue new regulations con-
sistent with Dodd-Frank.'55 Advocacy groups assert support in the Sen-
ate Report accompanying the proposed amendment, where section 1044
to preempt state consumer financial laws."); Letter from Phillip R. Robinson, Esq., Exec.
Dir., Civil Justice Inc., to John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency 8 (June 27, 2011) (suggesting a list of proposed changes and
arguing unless the OCC clearly incorporates Congress' intent, consumers will continue to
face the issue of having to overcome preemption defenses raised by national banks in law-
suits, and as a result, consumers may face difficulties in finding an attorney to represent
them in these types of cases).
151. N.Y. Banking Dep't Comment Letter, supra note 53, at 5-6; see also Letter from
David Certner, Legislative Counsel and Legislative Policy Dir. of Gov't Affair, AARP, to
John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
2 (June 27, 2011): Letter from Josh Zinner & Sarah Ludwig, Co-Dirs., Neighborhood Eco-
nomic Dev. Advocacy Project, to John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency 2 (June 27, 2011); Letter from David Hanzel, Dir.,
ANHD Inc., to John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency 3 (June 27, 2011).
152. 12 U.S.C. § 5553 (Supp. IV 2010).
153. N.Y. Banking Dep't Comment Letter, supra note 53, at 6.
154. Consumers Union Comment Letter, supra note 53, at 2-3.
155. See generally Letter from Ellen Taverna, Legislative Assoc., Nat'l Ass'n of Con-
sumer Advocates, to John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency 2 (June 27, 20100) [hereinafter NACA Comment Letter] (arguing
that the OCC is required under Dodd-Frank to rescind the 2004 regulations); the Nat'l Ass'n
of Attorneys Gen. Comment Letter, supra note 150, at 3.
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is described as "undoing broader standards adopted by rules, orders, and
interpretations issued by the OCC in 2004."l56
The ABA argued that case-by-case determinations fall under a
new section of the NBA, which is only applicable after the effective
date; thus, rules adopted before the effective date are not affected.'5 1
The ABA further emphasized, if case-by-case determination were ap-
plied retroactively, as a practical matter, national banks would be ex-
posed to extensive and costly litigation.'58 On the other hand, advocacy
groups argued the requirement for case-by-case determinations was in-
tended to give state banking laws a more thorough review by forcing
national banks to pursue challenges to individual state statutes rather
than preempting classes of laws. 159 Further, Consumers Union argued
that section 1043, addressing contracts entered into before the effective
date and section 1044, addressing state usury laws, are the only two sit-
uations where case-by-case determination does not apply. 160 Treasury
contended the proposed rule was not clear as to how the OCC intended
to apply case-by-case determinations, but if the OCC sought to preempt
categories of laws going forward without a case-by-case analysis they
would not be in conformity with Dodd-Frank.161
B. The 2004 Regulations as Amended
After Dodd-Frank, the OCC removed the "obstruct, impair or
condition" language from the 2004 regulations.' 62 Section 34.4, as orig-
inally enacted made three preemption determinations as follows: (1) ex-
plicitly preempted state laws, (2) state laws of general applicability that
did not "incidentally affect" a national bank, and (3) a catchall that per-
156. E.g., NACA Comment Letter, supra note 155, at 2 (citing S. Rep. No. 111-176, at
175 (Apr. 30, 2010)). See Letter from Jonathan Mintz, Comm'r, N.Y.C. Dep't of Consumer
Affairs, to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 1 (June 27, 2011).
157. ABA Comment Letter, supra note 85, at 6-7.
158. Id. at 7.
159. See, e.g., NACA Comment Letter, supra note 155, at 2.
160. Consumers Union Comment Letter, supra note 53, at 3-4 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 25b,
5553 (Supp. IV 2010)).
161. See Treasury Comment Letter, supra note 78, at 3.
162. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. 43,549, 43,557 (July 21, 2011) (to be codified in scattered parts of 12 C.F.R. pts. 4, 5,
7, 8, 28, and 34).
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mitted the OCC to add to the list of state laws applicable to national
banks if the OCC determined the law had an "incidental" effect on a na-
tional bank's powers and purposes. 163 Under section 34.4, "state laws
that 'obstruct, impair, or condition' a national bank's ability to fully ex-
ercise its Federally authorized real estate lending powers do not apply to
national banks. Specifically, a national bank may make real estate
loans ... without regard to state law limitations concerning" an enu-
merated list of laws.' 64 After removal of the "obstruct, impair, or condi-
tion" language, the regulations simply state: "[a] national bank may
make real estate loans . .. without regard to state law limitations con-
cerning" the enumerated list of laws.165 The Barnett Bank standard was
not substituted in its place. The OCC did not make any changes to the
enumerated list of laws. As originally enacted, subsection (b) stated
that certain state laws of general applicability were not preempted "to
the extent that they only incidentally affect the exercise of national
banks' real estate lending powers." 66 In conformity with Dodd-Frank,
the OCC replaced this weaker standard; state laws, "to the extent con-
sistent with the decision . .. in Barnett Bank are not preempted.",6 7
Lastly, in section (b)(9) the OCC was permitted to make a determina-
tion whether any other state law has only an "incidental" effect and is
therefore applicable to the national bank.168 The Barnett Bank standard
was substituted for the "incidental" standard.169
Section 7.4007 as originally enacted set forth a similar division
of preemption determinations. Under subsection (b)(1), state laws "that
obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank's .. . deposit taking pow-
ers" will be preempted and "without regard to state law limitations"
163. See 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (2011).
164. Id.
165. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 43,569 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 34.4). The Center for Responsible Lending
suggested that removal of "obstruct, impair or condition" is only in form, not in substance.
See Ctr. for Responsible Lending Comment Letter, supra note 10, at 11, 13.
166. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(b) (2011).
167. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 43,569 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(b)).
168. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(b)(9).
169. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 43,569 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(b)(9)).
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seven classes of laws are preempted.17 0 Post-Dodd-Frank, the "obstruct,
condition, or impair" language has been repealed, but the offending lan-
guage was not replaced with Barnett Bank. The regulation maintains
that a national bank may preempt a state law regardless of any limita-
tion on the same seven classes of laws set forth in the 2004 regula-
tions.17 ' Subsection (c), as originally enacted, established that state
laws of general applicability that "only incidentally affect the exercise
of a national bank's deposit-taking powers" are not preempted.172 In the
amended regulation, state laws are "not inconsistent with the deposit-
taking powers of national banks and apply to national banks to the ex-
tent consistent" with Barnett Bank if they fall into seven classes of
laws.173 Pre-Dodd-Frank, one class of laws was a catchall provision
that permitted the OCC to determine whether any other state laws, if
applied to national banks would have an "incidental effect." 74  This
standard was amended to be consistent with Barnett Bank.17 5  In the
2004 regulations, section 7.4008 set forth the same framework for lend-
ing activities. 176 The post-Dodd-Frank amendments to section 7.4008
are consistent with the amendments to section 7.4007.17
The "obstruct, impair or condition" language has been repealed
from each of the 2004 regulations.'7 8 Since the OCC has not replaced
this language with the Barnett Bank standard, there is no longer a broad
preemption standard set forth in the regulations. Under the current reg-
ulations, state laws are preempted regardless of their limitation if they
fall into one of the enumerated classes of laws, state laws are not
preempted if they fall into a category of general applicability and are in
accordance with Barnett Bank or the OCC determines that the state law
170. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4007(b).
171. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 43,565 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4007(b)).
172. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4007(c).
173. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 43,565 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4007(c)).
174. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4007(c)(8).
175. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 43,565 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4007(c)(8)).
176. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008.
177. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 43,565 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §7.4008).
178. Id. at 43,565-66, 43,569 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 34.4, 7.4008, 7.4008).
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is applicable to national banks because the law is in accordance with
Barnett Bank.179 If a state law does not fall into one of these categories,
the preemption determination will need to be made under section 25b of
the NBA. Also, cases contesting national bank operations that would
have been preempted under repealed section 7.4009 will now have to be
argued under section 25b. Based on the fact that section 1044 is set
forth in section 25b verbatim, a preemption determination of a state law
will be made in accordance with Barnett Bank.'"0
Although the inclusion of Barnett Bank in the regulations as
amended does not include a reference to the "prevent or significantly
interfere" language as referenced in Dodd-Frank, this is consistent with
the OCC's interpretation of section 1044. Since Dodd-Frank incorpo-
rated the whole analysis of Barnett Bank, it would not be necessary to
include this language in the regulations. However, because preemption
of state consumer financial laws is a contentious issue, the OCC is like-
ly to face litigation for not acting in accordance with law.'"' Although,
the OCC's interpretation is likely to withstand a challenge; in the inter-
im, there is likely to be uncertainty about the preemption standard.
If a cause of action is initiated alleging the OCC's interpretation
of Dodd-Frank is not in accordance with law, the court will review the
OCC's interpretation under the analysis for deference set forth in Chev-
ron v. Natural Resources Defense Council.182 First, the court will in-
quire whether Congress directly addressed the precise legal issue.'83
179. Id.
180. Compare Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementa-
tion, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,549 (July 21, 2011) (to be codified in scattered parts of 12 C.F.R. pts.
4, 5, 7, 8, 28, and 34), with 12 U.S.C. § 25b (Supp. IV 2010).
181. Section 1044(c) of Dodd-Frank requires regulations and orders by the OCC to be
supported by "substantial evidence, made on record of the proceeding, support[ing] the spe-
cific finding regarding the preemption of such provision in accordance with the legal stand-
ard" set forth in Barnett Bank. 12 U.S.C. § 25b(c) (Supp. IV 2010). This provision does not
apply to provisions that were effective before July 21, 2011. See Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,557. In its comment
letter to the OCC, Consumers Union stated that the new standard set forth for case-by-case
determinations is akin to the analysis for deference set forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134 (1944), rather than the standard set forth in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Fund, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which is more deferential to the agency. Consumers Union
Comment Letter, supra note 53, at 4-5.
182. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishing "Chevron" analysis).
183. Id. at 842.
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The precise issue in this case is whether the standard Congress set forth
in Dodd-Frank limited the OCC from adopting a preemption standard
that codified the whole analysis set forth by the Barnett Bank Court. In
analyzing whether Congress directly addressed the issue, the court will
look at Congress's expressed intent, which includes the legislative his-
tory; if what Congress intended is clear, then the court and the OCC are
required to defer to Congress.184 As previously discussed, the statutory
construction and the legislative history clearly demonstrate that Con-
gress intended to adopt the analysis in Barnett Bank as a whole.185
Since Congress clearly spoke on the issue and the OCC's regulations
adopted a standard for preemption in accordance with Dodd-Frank, the
regulations will withstand a challenge under Chevron. It is not neces-
sary to analyze the OCC's amended regulations further under the se-
cond step in Chevron; however, an analysis under the second step
would only strengthen the ability of the OCC to withstand a chal-
lenge.186 Under the second step, the court will look to the OCC's
amended regulation and determine whether the regulation as enacted
constituted a permissible interpretation of section 1044.187 Since the
OCC's interpretation of section 1044 would be a reasonable interpreta-
tion, the court will not disturb the OCC's decision.'8 8
C. How Have Courts Handled this New Legislation?
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit re-
cently had an opportunity to hear a case under the post-Dodd-Frank
NBA provision in Baptista v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.1 89 At issue
was a Florida statute, which prohibited a bank from cashing a check for
other than par value.190 Under the NBA, the bank alleged a fee to cash a
check was an incidental power necessary to the business of banking.191
To determine the proper preemption type, the court reviewed Dodd-
184. Id.
185. See discussion supra Parts III.A-B.
186. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
187. Id. at 843.
188. See id at 844-45.
189. 640 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2011).
190. Id. at 1196-97.
191. Id. at 1197.
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Frank's preemption provision and the Barnett Bank Court's analysis and
determined that the threshold question is "whether the state statute 'for-
bid[s], or ... impair[s] significantly, the exercise of a power that Con-
gress explicitly granted."'l 92 The Baptista court concluded, "it is clear
that under Dodd-Frank, the proper preemption test asks whether there is
a significant conflict between the state and federal statutes - that is, the
test for conflict preemption."' 93 The Florida statute was in "irreconcila-
ble conflict" with the NBA.194 The OCC noted this decision in its final
rule to support their conclusion that "prevent or significantly interferes"
is only a touchstone.195
In U.S. Bank N.A. v. Schipper,196 a district court in Iowa granted
the U.S. Bank's summary judgment motion in part, on the basis of
preemption.' 97 U.S. Bank, a nationally chartered bank, sought to pro-
vide services to state chartered banks, however, an Iowa state law pro-
hibited U.S. Bank from providing these services without the proper ap-
proval from a state administrator.'98 U.S. Bank filed an action seeking a
declaration that the NBA preempted the Iowa state law. 199 Although the
state suggested that Dodd-Frank heightened the standard for NBA
preemption, the court maintained that Dodd-Frank did not significantly
alter the standard for preemption.200 The court analogized the preemp-
tion provision in Dodd-Frank to Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 201
which analyzed under Barnett Bank whether the state law would "pre-
vent of significantly interfere" with the national bank's activities.202
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76
Fed. Reg. 43,549, 43,555 n.35 (July 21, 2011) (to be codified in scattered parts of 12 C.F.R.
pts. 4, 5, 7, 8, 28, and 34).
196. No. 4:10-cv-00064, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105390 (S.D. Iowa Aug. 29, 2011).
197. Id. at *26-27, *30.
198. Id. at *2-6.
199. Id. at *7.
200. Id. at *11-12 n.l.
201. 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
202. See Schipper, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105390, at *11-12 n.1 (referencing Watters,
550 U.S. at 12) ("States are permitted to regulate the activities of national banks where do-
ing so does not prevent of significantly interfere with the national bank's or national bank
regulator's exercise of its powers.").
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A district court in West Virginia was the first court to apply sec-
tion 7.4008 as amended, in Cline v. Bank ofAmerica, N.A.203 The plain-
tiff alleged that Bank of America violated the state's consumer credit
and protection act.204 Bank of America claimed the NBA preempted the
state law.205 The court concluded that the amendments to the 2004 reg-
ulations did not change the substance of the regulations; they are clarifi-
cations of the law and therefore do not present an issue of retroactivi-
ty.206 Post-Dodd-Frank, preemption determinations are no longer made
under the "obstruct, impair or condition" standard or whether there is
more than an "incidental[ ] affect" on the national bank, but rather,
preemption determinations will be made based on the principles of Bar-
nett Bank.2 07 "[T]he inquiry under Barnett Bank distills to whether the
state measure either (1) imposes an obligation on a national bank that is
in direct conflict with federal law, or (2) stands as an obstacle to the ac-
complishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress."20s
These decisions are being viewed as a determination that na-
tional banks have won the preemption battle because post-Dodd-Frank
there have not been significant changes in how the courts analyze
preemption issues.209 Industry participants have suggested that these
decisions support the notion that Dodd-Frank did not change the
preemption standard and other courts will be influenced in their deci-
sions by these cases.210 It has also been suggested that these recent de
cisions provide a better understanding of how the Barnett Bank standard
203. No. 10 Civ. 8217, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118337 (W.D. W.Va. Oct. 13, 2011).
204. Id. at *2.
205. Id. at *3-4.
206. Id. at *22.
207. Id. at*l8-19.
208. Id. at *25. The court concluded that the state statute does not concern "state con-
sumer financial laws," and therefore the 2004 regulation cannot be used to preempt the state
law.
209. See Kate Davidson, Post Dodd-Frank, Preemption Fight Still Favoring Bankers,
AM. BANKER, Sept. 29,2011, 2011 WLNR 19865475 (Westlaw).
210. See id.
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will be applied by the courts. 2 11 However, it is too soon to determine if
anybody has won the preemption battle.212
D. What is the Status of Case Law Based on "Obstructs, Impairs or
Conditions"?
1. Section 7.4009: Applicability of State Law to National Bank
Operations
While courts have made determinations under section 7.4009,
they are far and few between. A thorough analysis of the case law ref-
erencing section 7.4009(b) leads to the conclusion that these cases will
not be affected by Dodd-Frank. Less than twenty cases reference sec-
tion 7.4009. Of these cases, not a single case made a decision to
preempt state law solely on the basis that the law would "obstruct, im-
pair or condition" federal law. In cases where the court found preemp-
tion, the decision was not based exclusively on this language. 213  The
majority of cases denied preemption based on one of the following rea-
sons: both federal and state law could be applied without frustration of
the NBA, 2 14 the state law was of general applicability,215 or the state law
had only an incidental effect. 216 Since the cases decided under section
211. Id. National banks, in anticipation of challenges from the states may need to go di-
rectly to the OCC to get an opinion first whereby the decision will be given deference, sub-
ject to the new scrutiny standards, or the national bank could go directly to a court, where
the court can rely on case precedent. See id
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Pacific Capital Bank, N.A. v. Milgram, No. 08-0223, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19639, at *24 (D. N.J Mar. 13, 2008) (citing Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v.
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996)).
214. See, e.g., SPGGC, LLC v. Blumenthal, 408 F. Supp. 2d 87, 94 (D. Conn 2006)
("[C]ompliance with [state law] as applied in this case is not an obstacle to the purposes and
objectives of Congress in enacting the NBA.").
215. See, e.g., Mwantembe v. TD Bank, N.A., 669 F. Supp. 2d 545, 553-54 (E.D. Pa.
2007) (finding the state law prohibits deceptive and misleading conduct by all businesses;
this is a state law of general applicability and does not impair a bank's ability to exercise its
gift-card issuing powers, assuming arguendo that the law did impair, the effect is only inci-
dental).
216. See Jefferson v. Chase Bank Home Fin., C 06-6510 TEH, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
101031, at *28-29 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2008) (denying Chase's claim that the state law was
preempted because it only "incidentally affect[ed]" the bank's ability to exercise its pow-
ers); Hood v. Santa Barbara Bank & Trust, 143 Cal. App. 4th 526, 546 (Cal. App. 2d Dist.
2006) (denying the preemption claim because the state law did not "impose any substantial
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7.4009 did not rely exclusively on "obstruct, impair or condition," the
cases are still good authority post-Dodd-Frank.
2. Regulations with Illustrative Classes of Laws that are Expressly
Preempted
Unlike section 7.4009, case law has been established under sec-
tion 34.4 where state laws have been preempted based solely on the
state law falling into one of the fourteen enumerated classes of laws.217
It is not necessary to go through all cases where section 34.4 has been
applied to preempt a state law, however, it is helpful to look at the anal-
ysis undertaken by some courts. In a West Virginia decision an issue
arose with processing and servicing of mortgages, an enumerated class
of laws under section 34.4.218 The court first looked at whether the type
of law at issue was listed in the regulation; once that is determined, the
analysis ends.219 The state law is summarily preempted without a dis-
cussion of the effect the state law would have. 220 This same summary
preemption has been applied under section 7.4007221 and section
7.4008.222
limitations upon, or 'obstruct, impair or condition' a bank's actions.").
217. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(1-13) (2011).
218. Staats v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 3:10-CV-68, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142886, at
*20 (W.D. W.Va. Nov. 4, 2010) (following an outlined analysis of the Office of Thrift Su-
pervision, which was applied to a significantly similar regulation under the Home Owner's
Loan Act of 1933).
219. Id.
220. See id at *19-20, *32; Martinez v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 598 F.3d 549,
556-57 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding the state law on excessive underwriting fees was preempted
by the NBA because 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(10) permits banks to underwrite mortgages without
regard to state laws); Acosta v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C 10-991 JF, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 50602, at *24-25 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2010) (finding the state law on foreclosure
avoidance was preempted by the NBA because the law conflicted with 12 C.F.R. §
34.4(a)(10), addressing "[p]rocessing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or invest-
ment or participation in, mortgages,").
221. See, e.g., Larin v. Bank ofAm., 725 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2010) ("Ac-
cording to the framework, courts should first determine whether the state laws at issue fall
within subsection 12 C.F.R. § 7.4007(b)(2). If they do, the laws are preempted, and no fur-
ther analysis is necessary. If the laws do not fall within subsection (b)(2), courts must con-
sider whether the laws fall within subsection (c).").
222. Kilgore v. Keybank, N.A., 712 F. Supp. 2d 939, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ("States are
explicitly barred from imposing limits on the 'terms of credit' extended by a national bank"
under 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(b)(2)(iv)).
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The OCC maintains that regulations in effect before Dodd-
Frank's effective date are not subject to the new procedural require-
ments, but continued validity is subject to the preemption standard set
forth in Dodd-Frank.223 On this basis the OCC is required to analyze
each class of laws set forth in the 2004 regulations. The OCC asserted
in its final rule that it "re-reviewed" whether the preempted classes of
laws enumerated in the 2004 regulations are consistent with the Barnett
Bank standard and determined, based on the OCC's experience with the
various laws and the potential impact on a national bank, that the laws
are consistent with Dodd-Frank.224 One example is set forth in the final
rule; the OCC analyzed the lending area and the types of laws that could
be imposed that would "meaningfully interfere" with a national bank's
225powers. No analysis is provided to determine why, for example, a
state law would affect risk mitigation, only that a state law would inter-
fere.226 Although the classes of law were set forth under the 2004 rules,
it is not necessarily determinative that these regulations would fail un-
der Barnett Bank. The OCC needs to disclose a thoroughly analyzed
review of each class of laws that sets forth whether they are complicit
with the Barnett Bank conflict preemption standard.227
Another issue arises where the courts relied on language in a
regulation which exempted certain areas of state law from preemption,
on the condition they "only incidentally affect[ed]" the national bank's
exercise of its powers. 228 After Dodd-Frank and the OCC's final rule,
these regulations were amended to include the conflict preemption
standard of Barnett Bank.229 In a 2008 case in Washington, the court
223. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. 43,549, 43,557 (July 21, 2011) (to be codified in scattered parts of 12 C.F.R. pts. 4, 5,
7, 8, 28, and 34).
224. Id. at 43,556.
225. Id.
226. See Ctr. for Responsible Lending Comment Letter, supra note 10, at 13 (arguing
that post-Dodd-Frank the OCC does not have the authority to make any categorical determi-
nations that state laws are preempted without justifying how the determination is consistent
with the principles of Barnett Bank).
227. Letter from Steven Alan Bennett, Exec. Vice President, United Servs. Auto. Ass'n,
to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 2 (June 27, 2011) (suggesting the OCC follow
the framework set forth in its determination to preempt the Georgia Fair Lending Act).
228. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(b) (2011).
229. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 43,565-66, 43,569 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4009(c); 7.4008(e); 34.4(b)).
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found the state common law and statute imposed "more than an inci-
dental effect" on the national bank to exercise its lending operation
powers.230 Since the regulation only permitted state laws that were con-
sistent with federal law and had only an incidental effect on national
banks, anything inconsistent or having more than an incidental effect
would be preempted. 231 This court only analyzed whether the state laws
were being used as a means to impose a limitation on the national
banks.232 From the brevity of this analysis it is impossible to conclude
whether this decision would have come out differently under a Barnett
Bank analysis. This leads to the question of whether this case is still
good law and what should be done with similar cases?
V. CONCLUSION
Studies have suggested that preemption contributed to the "dete-
rioration in lending standards and a rollback in consumer protection
during the subprime crisis."233 Congress addressed these concerns with
the adoption of section 1044 of Dodd-Frank. Dodd-Frank has shed light
on the OCC's abusive preemption standards and has scaled back the
scope of the OCC's authority to preempt state laws. Throughout the
legislative process and subsequent colloquies with the senators who ne-
gotiated section 1044, it is unambiguous that Congress intended to
adopt a preemption standard in accordance with the whole analysis set
forth in the Barnett Bank decision. Although the statute makes specific
reference to "prevent or significantly interfere," it is apparent that Con-
gress intended this reference to be an indication to the OCC that it had
gone too far in what it perceived was the scope of preemption. Subse-
quent case law confirms that Dodd-Frank codified the Barnett Bank
case in whole.
In order for the OCC to comply with Barnett Bank, the repeal of
"obstruct, impair or condition" was required. With the deletion of sec-
230. Fultz v. World S&L Ass'n, No. C08-0343RSL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65778, at
*4-5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 18, 2008).
231. See id.
232. See id at *4.
233. Lei Ding, et al., The Impact ofFederal Preemption of State Anti-Predatory Lending
Laws on Foreclosure Crisis 2 (Univ. of N.C. Ctr. For Cmty. Capital, Working Paper 2010),
available at http://www.ccc.unc.edu/documents/Preemptionfinal_August%2027.pdf.
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tion 7.4009, the OCC has made a significant effort to comply with
Dodd-Frank; however, it is not clear whether the enumerated classes of
laws set forth in sections 34.4, 7.4007 and 7.4008 are complicit with
Barnett Bank. While the OCC has stated in the final rule that the 2004
regulations have been "re-reviewed;" disclosure of one "re-reviewed"
class of laws with a conclusory analysis is not sufficient to determine
whether these laws are in compliance with Dodd-Frank. It is necessary
for the OCC to make a fully analyzed disclosure if it is to avoid a chal-
lenge to the amended regulations.234 Until that time comes, consumers,
courts and banks are left to question the state of the law for preemption
of consumer financial laws.
DANYEALE L. HENSLEY
234. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov't Affairs Comment Letter, supra note 52, at 1.
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